By Caitlin Welsh and Emma Dodd
This series—led by the Futures Lab and featuring scholars across CSIS—explores emerging challenges and opportunities likely to shape peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. All contributions in the series can be found by visiting Strategic Headwinds: Understanding the Forces Shaping Ukraine’s Path to Peace.
Russia’s recent attacks on Greater Odesa port infrastructure and foreign-flagged grain-carrying vessels in the Black Sea marked the most intense attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure in over a year. Four of the ships hit in October were carrying agricultural commodities, including vegetable oil for the UN World Food Programme in Gaza, as well as corn and grain shipments for Egypt, Italy, and Southern Africa, according to statements by the Ukrainian and UK governments. As widely reported by CSIS and others, Ukraine’s agriculture sector has been a major front in Russia’s war in Ukraine since February 2022. With the September and October 2024 attacks, Russia continues its system-wide attacks on Ukraine’s agriculture infrastructure, negatively affecting Ukraine’s agricultural production and exports and thereby undercutting a major source of Ukraine’s export revenue.
How Russia’s Attacks on Ukrainian Agriculture Serve Its Broader Economic and Political Goals
In early 2022, former Russian president and current deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev declared food to be Russia’s “silent weapon.” By August 2023, President Vladimir Putin declared Moscow’s intention to “replace Ukrainian grain” with Russian grain, particularly to “needy countries.” A major goal of Russia in its widespread attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure has been to reduce the reliance of food-importing countries on Ukrainian grains and oilseeds, which opens opportunities for Russia to expand agricultural trade—and influence—in these countries, many of which have been made more food-insecure by Russia’s war in Ukraine.
In February 2024, CSIS analyzed the impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war on Ukraine’s and Russia’s export levels and trade relationships, finding that since February 2022, Ukraine’s grain exports had fallen relative to prewar exports for every region except Europe. (With limited access to its Black Sea ports, Ukraine was forced to export much of its grains through its European neighbors and thus increased exports to some European countries.) According to Trade Data Monitor, Ukraine’s latest wheat exports follow a similar pattern: in the calendar year 2021, Ukraine exported about 11 percent of its wheat to sub-Saharan Africa. In 2022, Ukraine exported less than 6 percent of its wheat to the region. In 2023, that percentage had dropped to 2.5, and from January to August 2024, wheat exports to sub-Saharan Africa were less than 1 percent of Ukraine’s total wheat exports. From July through October of 2024, Russia exported 2.7 metric million tons of wheat to sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 20 percent of its total wheat exports and marking a 39 percent increase in its exports to the region year on year. Russia has also delivered free grains to countries friendly to Russia, including Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Mali, Zimbabwe, Somalia, and the Central African Republic.
Maintaining this influence in global agricultural markets is not only a geopolitical imperative for Russia but underpins the economic goals Putin has put forward for the next two presidential terms: in May 2024, Russian state media outlet RT reported that Putin has issued a goal for Russia to have the fourth-highest GDP in the world by 2030, an effort involving a shift in exports “away from energy products, with agriculture considered a significant driver of future foreign trade.” Russia’s recent enforcement of a price floor for its wheat exports reflects Russia’s use of its influence on agricultural markets to increase revenue from food exports.
Negotiating the Needs of Ukraine’s Agriculture Sector
Ukrainian agriculture remains one of the country’s most productive sectors despite the estimated $10.3 billion in damages and $83 billion in losses it has incurred as a result of Russia’s war. In 2023, the agriculture, forestry, and fishing sector contributed roughly 7.4 percent of Ukraine’s GDP, and food exports accounted for 60.3 percent of all merchandise exports, according to the World Bank.
Supporting Ukraine’s agriculture sector requires not only on-farm investments, such as those provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development and its partners, but also increased defense of Ukraine’s ports and affordable insurance for ships entering and exiting them. A mutual security guarantee for free commercial trade through the Black Sea in compliance with the Montreux Convention of the Regime of the Straits, as well as the Danube River, will be necessary for Ukraine’s agricultural recovery, enabling Ukraine to make full use of its Black Sea export capacity and to utilize resources for recovery and reconstruction instead of naval defense. Any agreement should exclude opportunities for logistic interference (e.g., onerous cargo inspections) and include security guarantees for all commercial maritime infrastructure. Medium-to-long-term needs include the reconstruction or replacement of agricultural equipment, machinery, and facilities along the “build back better” principle while preparing Ukraine’s agriculture sector for European Union accession, as well as investing in Ukraine’s agricultural public institutions to support policymaking and provision of key services to agricultural enterprises. Recent CSIS research has further discussed the importance of continued U.S. support for demining operations on Ukraine’s farmland as an immediate and long-term imperative for Ukraine’s agricultural recovery—one that can provide near-term economic benefits for Ukraine’s economy and Ukrainian farmers. The incoming administration could consider advocating for funding these purposes through G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans to Ukraine and other funding vehicles.
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